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HAZID and HAZOP

OTECSA can provide the expertise you need for your hazard studies, we have vast experience in HAZOP and HAZID across many high hazard industries

Recent hazard study projects

In the past few years OTECSA, a sample of the HAZOP and HAZID studies OTECSA have undertaken is provided below:

HAZOP studies for a new brewhouse project, roaster and syrup plant (Puremalt)
HAZOP and LOPA study for a new distillery in Central Scotland (Falkirk Distillery), North Scotland (8 Doors) and Wiltshire (Wylye)
HAZID, HAZOP and LOPA studies for a sink manufacturing expansion project (Slovakia)
HAZID and HAZOP for a distillery mashing project (Girvan, William Grant and Sons Distillers)
HAZOP and LOPA for a distillery tank farm expansion project (Balvenie, William Grant and Sons Distillers)
HAZOP for a malt distillery expansion project (Glenfiddich, William Grant and Sons Distillers)
HAZID and HAZOP for a pilot plant and full scale plant food protein production facility (3FBio)
HAZID and HAZOP for a major metal plating line process (The Royal Mint)
HAZOP for a craft distillery new distillation process and bottling line (Brewdog Distilling)
HAZOP for a major new Irish Whiskey Distillery - full distillery HAZOP (Tullamore)
HAZOP for road tanker bottom loading modifications on flammable spirit duty
HAZID for a new gas compressor system
HAZID for internal building tank re-location, to minimise risks in line with HSG 176
HAZOP for a wiped film evaporation process in the pharmaceutical industry

Hazard Studies - an overview

Hazard Studies are a suite of risk assessments developed in the 1970s and 1980s by ICI. There are various Hazard Studies which can be carried out, all at different stages of a project lifecycle. Unless a company has an experienced project team, a well-planned project and a Hazard Study process, often the first time a process risk assessment is carried out is a HAZOP at the detailed design stage. The implementation of a more thorough Hazard Study process allows the concept of inherent safety to be introduced early into the project lifecycle and ensure the HSE’s requirement of a “suitable and sufficient” risk assessment has been addressed. Below is a brief overview of the first three design stage Hazard Studies, all of these assessments should include a representative team of personnel with knowledge of design, operations, maintenance and health and safety. The assessment should also have independence, to ensure objective reasoning throughout and this can be provided by the inclusion of a trained and experienced Hazard Study Leader from OTECSA Consulting.

Hazard Study 1

Hazard Study 1 should be carried out early in a project design, at a conceptual stage where the process, scale of operations and proposed location of the facility has been identified. Hazard Study 1 should enable the team to identify what the major hazards from the proposed process could be and carry out some fact finding on previous incidents, the materials being handled, major legislation and best practice to consider and plan what additional risk assessments are required based on the level of risk identified.

Hazard Study 2 - HAZID

A HAZID (Hazard Identification Study) should be carried out when a process flowsheet has been developed (with no need for P&ID level design). HAZID is similar to the HAZOP process but it is much faster and focuses on major hazard category guidewords. The focus on these major hazard guidewords means that because of the early stage of design, adequate safeguards and re-design activities can still be carried out without a major impact on the project schedule. If the project waits until HAZOP to tease out the issues it can be too late or costly to rectify some of the problems.

Hazard Study 3 - HAZOP

Most engineers are familiar with HAZOP as it is the main and most thorough process risk assessment. HAZOP is normally carried out at a detailed design stage, when P&IDs are close to being frozen but ideally it should be preceded at earlier design stages by Hazard Study 1 (as early in the design as possible) and HAZID (Hazard Identification – when a process flowsheet is available). HazOp follows a systematic approach – a bottom up process – using deviation guidewords to stimulate the team to identify all possible causes of things that could go wrong with the process. This systematic approach is carried out on small sections of the plant called nodes, with all the nodes building up to provide an assessment of the full process. HAZOP is inherently time consuming but it has been shown to be highly effective in ensuring major plant issues are identified. The HAZOP process allows all risks to be scored based on the client’s risk tolerability to shown where design gaps lie and what areas require more focus to ensure all risks are as low as reasonably practicable.

Common HAZOP problems

Some typical problems we encounter when preparing for or facilitating a HAZOP:

· HAZOP team not clearly briefed on the project and find themselves learning the design and operating intent through the HAZOP meetings. This can add to additional time required in the meetings, a lack of engagement with operations on the basis of a “we’ve not been consulted on what we really want” attitude and difficulties on agreeing what should actually be assessed, given there is clearly scope for variations on the design chosen.

· Poorly defined control system / cause and effects. This can make a smooth HAZOP difficult, leading to more time, cost and uncertainty as to what the design intent is.

· HAZOP carried out without prior thought to suitable protective measures for high severity events. This can lead to excessive instrumented systems or a requirement for high integrity systems (e.g SIL rated systems).

· HAZOP carried out too early, when design is not complete or design reviews have not been completed. This can lead to design within the meeting which is time consuming and can mean prior assessment needs revision. In some cases large parts of design can be incomplete, leading to a requirement for phasing of HAZOP as the design develops.

· Lack of clarity on HAZOP action close out procedures. Once you have done the assessment it is imperative that actions are followed through and responses adequately responded and justified with the close out agreement including a representative team similar to that of the original HAZOP (and not just one powerful person deciding actions are complete).

Many of these issues can be prevented by following a more comprehensive Hazard Study process, including Hazard Study 1 and HAZID in advance of HAZOP. However there is also a need for a clear structured approach to the HAZOP, with communication in advance of the meetings and clarity on the post HAZOP procedures. OTECSA can assist in all of these areas to help your Hazard Studies run as smoothly as possible.

How can OTECSA help?

If you are in need of help or not sure where to start with your hazard studies get in touch and we would be happy to help in identifying what your needs are. OTECSA can offer assistance in defining which Hazard Studies are appropriate for your project.

OTECSA can offer competitive pricing and we have extensive recent experience across many industries such as petrochemicals, distilled spirits and manufacturing. OTECSA are trained and accredited at leading Hazard Studies. Our training has been provided by ABB in their IChemE accredited Hazard Study leader training course, find out more about this training course here. OTECSA Hazard Study leaders are chartered members of the IChemE, registered with the Engineering Council.

Find out more about Hazard Studies

A more detailed overview of the Hazard Study process can be found here. This includes details of post-design Hazard Studies such as Hazard Study 4 (pre-commissioning), Hazard Study 5 (post-commissioning to ensure the plant is operating as expected) and Hazard Study 6 (around a year after commissioning).

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